隨著數位時代的發展，數位經濟巨人如Google、Facebook和Amazon等不斷透過收購其他公司來擴大其市場地位，但這些結合案卻很少受到競爭執法機關的挑戰。傳統競爭法主要以價格為重心，而數位平台的複雜性和價格結構的不中立使得市場界定上面臨困難，競爭影響的評估也變得不易。此外，數位經濟的競爭主要是在大集團和生態系之間進行，使得傳統的假設獨占者測試法難以適用於這些案件。
大數據技術的創新使得使用者數據成為數位巨人市場地位的重要組成部分，因此隱私問題也開始受到關注。有學者嘗試以隱私角度切入競爭分析來改善數位市場的困境。然而，如何分析隱私問題對市場的影響仍然是一個問題，隱私保護和侵害難以量化計算是主要問題之一，並且在各國的法規中，使用者數據通常受到個人資料保護法的專法保護，導致隱私問題在競爭管制中經常被刻意忽略，這使得競爭法對其管制的必要性和適當性成為一個問題。本文嘗試將隱私保護納入競爭分析，作為評估結合案是否同意的標準之一，以連接隱私保護問題和競爭法對數位經濟巨人結合行為無法有效管制的情況，尤其在數位產業的結合案中，使競爭主管機關能夠綜合考慮隱私風險，作為是否同意結合案的判斷標準之一並以Facebook/WhatsApp與Google/DoubleClick結合案進行案例分析，以探討其可行性和適用性。

With the development of the digital era, digital giants such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon have expanded their market power through various acquisitions. However, these merger cases are rarely challenged by competition authorities. Traditional competition laws have primarily focused on “price”, but the complexity of digital platforms and the non-neutrality of pricing structures make market definition and assessment of competitive impact much more challenging.
The innovation of big data technology has made user data a critical component of the market, leading to increasing concern about privacy issues. Some scholars have attempted to approach competition analysis from a privacy perspective to address the challenges the merger control faces but analyzing the impact of privacy issues on the market remains an issue due to difficulties in measure privacy protection and violations. Moreover, in various national regulatory frameworks, user data often falls under the specialized protection of personal data protection laws, causing privacy matters to be deliberately overlooked in competition regulation. This raises questions about the necessity and appropriateness of incorporating competition law into privacy protection.
This paper seeks to incorporate privacy protections into competition analysis as one of the criteria for evaluating the approval of merger cases. By connecting privacy protection issues with the ineffectiveness of competition law in regulating the acquisition, especially in the digital market, competition authorities can comprehensively consider privacy risks as part of their decision-making process. The paper examines the feasibility and applicability of this approach by analyzing the Facebook/WhatsApp and Google/DoubleClick merger cases, aiming to explore potential solutions.

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