過去文獻發現審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊可以改善公司盈餘品質。本研究係探討審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊是否能顯著減少CEO誘因薪酬支付比例，此外，更進一步探討此重疊關係是否能改善公司績效。本研究以美國2000年至2006年S&P 500公司為樣本，發現審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊和CEO誘因薪酬支付比例有顯著負向關係。同時也發現審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊和公司營運績效有顯著正向關係，本研究更進一步發現藉由審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊能減少CEO誘因薪酬支付比例與Tobin’s Q之間的正向關係。本研究實證結果主張藉由審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊，將使CEO誘因薪酬支付比例減少，使CEO不過度追求股價及自我利益，進而提升公司營運績效，此係歸因於審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊會產生知識外溢的效果，使審計委員會更容易監督CEO的行為。

Prior research finds that overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees can improve firm’s financial reporting quality. In this paper, I investigate whether firms that the overlapping membership is negative related to CEO incentive pay and whether this leads to improve firm performance. Analyzing data on a sample of S&P 500 firms over the period 2000-2006, I find that the CEO incentive pay is significantly reduced by overlapping membership in the board of firm. Furthermore, I also find a significant positive relationship between overlapping membership and firm operating performance. In addition, I also investigate whether overlapping membership are related to the motivation of self-interest maximization. I find that the board of directors can through overlapping membership, reduces positive relationship between CEO incentive pay and the Tobin’s Q. My results suggest that a decrease in CEO incentive pay through overlapping membership, which in turn CEOs focus on firm operating and do not seek the high stock price excessively to maximize self-interest, then improve firm operating performance. To sum up, there is knowledge spillover from the compensation committee to the audit committee, resulting in better operating performance. I interpret this to suggest that it is more effective in monitoring the CEO’s actions.

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